Systematization of Knowledge and Implementation: Short Identity-Based
  Signatures by Kar, Diptendu M. & Ray, Indrajit
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
05
36
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 A
ug
 20
19
Systematization of Knowledge and
Implementation: Short Identity-Based Signatures.
Diptendu Mohan Kar and Indrajit Ray
Colorado State University, Fort Collins CO 80523, USA
{diptendu.kar, indrajit.ray}@colostate.edu
Abstract
Identity-Based signature schemes are gaining a lot of popularity every
day. Over the last decade, there has been a lot of schemes that have been
proposed. Several libraries are there that implement identity-based cryp-
tosystems that include identity-based signature schemes like the JPBC
library which is written in Java and the charm-crypto library written
in python. However, these libraries do not contain all of the popular
schemes, rather the JPBC library contains only one identity-based signa-
ture scheme and the charm-crypto contains three. Furthermore, the im-
plemented schemes are designed to work on one particular pairing curve.
In pairing-based cryptosystems, even for a given signature scheme, the
size of the signature and the performance i.e. the time to sign and ver-
ify depends on the chosen pairing curve. There are many applications
in which the signature size is of more importance than the performance
and similarly other applications where the performance is of more impor-
tance than signature size. In this work, we describe the popular signature
schemes and their implementation using the JPBC library and describe
how different pairing curves affect the signature size and performance. We
also provide two methods to further shorten the signature size which is
not present in the libraries by default.
Keywords: Identity-Based Signatures, Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
Pairing-Based Cryptography, JPBC
1 Introduction
Identity-based cryptosystems were first proposed by Shamir in 1984[19]. In his
pioneering work, although he came up with a working solution for identity-based
signatures, he could not describe a fully working scheme for identity-based en-
cryption. The identity-based encryption is possible only through pairing-based
cryptography. Not only identity-based encryption but identity-based key ex-
change, identity-based identification, and many other schemes are possible be-
cause of pairing-based cryptography. Pairing-based cryptography emerged in
2000 with Joux’s tripartite Diffie Hellman[8] and Sakai’s pairing-based cryptosystem[17].
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But it gained a lot of popularity with Dan Boneh’s groundbreaking solution to
a long time unsolved problem of “Identity-based Encryption”[3]
Pairing-based cryptography is an extension of elliptic curve cryptography.
Pairing-based cryptography uses specially chosen curves that allows us to check
more complicated equations over elliptic curve points. Pairing or bilinear pairing
(and hence the name) can be thought of as an operation which when applied to
elements of two groups, generates an output element which belongs to a third
group. A detailed explanation of how pairing-based cryptography works can be
found here [11]. There are many resources on the internet apart from the referred
paper which can be used since this is one of the hot topics in cryptography. We
will not be going through all the details of the working principles of pairing-
based cryptography. We will be going through the definition of bilinear maps,
and then move on to describe the special curves that support pairing.
The following definition of “pairing” is commonly used in most academic
papers[11] -
Let G1, G2 be two additive cyclic groups of prime order q, and GT another
cyclic group of order q written multiplicatively. A pairing is a map: e : G1 ×
G2 → GT , which satisfies the following properties:
Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ F ∗q , ∀P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 : e (aP, bQ) = e (P,Q)
ab
Non-degeneracy: e 6= 1
Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e.
If the same group is used for the first two groups (i.e. G1 = G2), the pairing
is called symmetric and is a mapping from two elements of one group to an
element from a second group.
Some researchers classify pairing instantiations into three (or more) basic
types:
1. G1 = G2
2. G1 6= G2 but there is an efficiently computable homomorphism φ : G2 →
G1.
3. G1 6= G2 and there are no efficiently computable homomorphisms between
G1 and G2.
There exist many libraries in different programming languages that imple-
ment pairing based cryptosystems and identity-based schemes like identity-
based encryption, identity-based signatures, identity-based identification, etc.
The very first library which implemented was the PBC library written by Ben
Lynn [10] in C. Using that library similar pairing based libraries have been writ-
ten in other programming languages like Java - JPBC library [5]and Python -
charm crypto library [1]. There are many identity-based signature schemes, but
in the JPBC library, there is only one scheme that is implemented - Paterson
and Schuldt[15]. Charm crypto library has three IBS schemes implemented. In
this work, we are interested in identity-based signatures specifically and find
which scheme offers the shortest signature size using the JPBC library.
There exist many applications where the signature size is of more importance
rather than the performance. It is always possible to reduce the signature size
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just by shortening the length of the prime but that will compromise the security.
The curve parameters we will be using are provided in the library already and
are considered to be secure. One of the emerging areas that short signatures
are applicable is in biology. Kar et. al [9] proposed applying digital signatures
to the DNA in living organisms. In their work, it is very important to use short
signatures as longer signatures might make the organism unstable. In their
work, they have used the original Shamir’s IBS scheme and 1024 bit keys, but
pairing based scheme will be a better choice because we can get better security
at much fewer bits. In a pairing based system, even for a fixed signature scheme,
the signature size is dependent on the type of curve used for pairing. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no other work that talks about the different signature
schemes and how they compare using the different curves that are built into the
JPBC library. The ultimate goal of this work is to integrate all the schemes
with the JPBC library which will provide users with a lot of more choices and
flexibility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
the curve parameters and how each group element will act for each curve. In
section 3, we discuss a couple of signature schemes that are very popular yet not
implemented in the JPBC library or charm crypto library. In section 4 we show
two techniques that can be used to further shorten the signature size which is
not built into the libraries.
2 Pairing Curves
Pairing curves are the special elliptic curves that support the bilinear pairing
operation. In the libraries, they are predefined. There are a couple of “types”
of curves that are present. Each type of curve is different in its base form or
equation that defines it. Other than the predefined curves that are already
present in the library, the parameters for each curve can be regenerated as
to choose better security e.g. length of prime. In the JPBC library, they are
present in the “properties” files and in the charm crypto library they are present
in the “pairingcurves.py” file. The different types of curves that are available
in the JPBC library are as follows:
Type A: Type A pairings are constructed on the curve y2 = x3 + x over
the field Fq for some prime q = 3 mod 4. Both G1 and G2 are the group of
points E(Fq), so this pairing is symmetric. It turns out #E(Fq) = q + 1 and
#E(Fq2 ) = (q + 1)
2. Thus the embedding degree k is 2, and hence GT is a
subgroup of Fq2 . The order r is some prime factor of q + 1.
There is only one built-in type A curve in the JPBC library. The parameters
in the file a.properties are -
type a
q 8780710799663312522437781984754049815806883199414208211028653
3992664756308 8022295707862517942266222142315585876958231745927
7713367317481324925129998224791
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h 1201601226489114607938882136674053420480295440125131182291961
5131047207289359704531102844802183906537786776
r 730750818665451621361119245571504901405976559617
exp2 159
exp1 107
sign1 1
sign0 1
Here, q is 512 bits or 64 bytes, r is 160 bits or 20 bytes. It is recommended
to use at least 512-bit primes for type A curves. Other parameters can be
generated using the following line of code -
ParametersGenerator pbcPg = new PBCTypeACurveGenerator(rBits, qBits);
The size of the group elements are as follows - since r is 20 bytes, any element
in the group Zr is 20 bytes. An element in the group G1 is an element over
Fq. Since q is 512 bits or 64 bytes, an element of the group G1 is 2*64 = 128
bytes (each element is a point whose x cord is 64 bytes and y cord is 64 bytes).
Since this curve uses symmetric pairing, the elements of the group G2 and GT
are also 128 bytes each. In the charm crypto library this same curve is present
and is called using the tag “SS512”.
Type A1: Type A1 uses the same equation, but have different fields. It
supports fields of composite order. There is only one built-in type A1 curve in
the JPBC library. We are not listing the parameters here but it can be found in
the a1.properties file. The same curve is present in the charm crypto library
and is called using the tag “SS1024”. The prime n has length 1022 bits. The
size of the group elements are as follows - any element in the group Zr is 1024
bits or 128 bytes. An element in the group G1, G2 and GT are all 2080 bits or
260 bytes. The code to generate type A1 parameters is -
ParametersGenerator pbcPg = new PBCTypeA1CurveGenerator();
Type D: These are ordinary curves of with embedding degree 6, whose
orders are prime or a prime multiplied by a small constant. A type D curve is
defined over some field Fq and has order h∗r where r is a prime and h is a small
constant. Over the field, Fq6 its order is a multiple of r
2. Typically the order
of the curve E is around 170 bits, as is Fq, the base field, thus q
k is around the
1024-bit mark which is commonly considered good enough. These type of curves
were discovered by Miyaji, Nakabayashi, and Takano and commonly known as
MNT curves[12].
There are 3 type D curves built-in the library - d159, d201, and d224. The
numbers represent the bits in the prime q. Let us look at the parameters in the
d159.properties file -
type d
q 625852803282871856053922297323874661378036491717
n 625852803282871856053923088432465995634661283063
h 3
r 208617601094290618684641029477488665211553761021
a 581595782028432961150765424293919699975513269268
b 517921465817243828776542439081147840953753552322
k 6
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Here, q is 160 bits or 20 bytes, r is 160 bits or 20 bytes. The parameters a
and b are the coefficients in the equation E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b. The size of the
group elements are as follows - since r is 20 bytes, any element in the group Zr
is 20 bytes. An element in the group G1 is an element over Fq. Since q is 160
bits or 20 bytes, an element of group G1 is 2*20 = 40 bytes. The elements of
the group G2 are over Fq6 and hence they are 120 bytes. An element of GT is
also 120 bytes. Apart from the parameters listed above there are some more
which we did not show, they are nk - number of points in E(Fqk), hk where
nk = hk ∗ r ∗ r, coeff0, coeff1, coeff2 and nqr - quadratic nonresidue in Fq. The
other two files have the same parameters just the prime bits are more. The code
to generate type D parameters is -
ParametersGenerator pbcPg = new
PBCTypeDParametersGenerator(discriminant);
The charm crypto library contains the same three “d-type” curves and are
called using the tags “MNT159”, “MNT201” and “MNT224” respectively.
Type E: The CM (Complex Multiplication) method of constructing elliptic
curves starts with the Diophantine equation DV 2 = 4q − t3. If t=2 and q =
Dr2h2 + 1 for some prime r (which we choose to be a Solinas prime) and some
integer h , we find that this equation is easily solved with V = 2rh .
As q is typically 1024 bits, group elements take a lot of space to represent.
Moreover, many optimizations do not apply to this type, resulting in a slower
pairing. Hence this type E curve is not generally used in any schemes and so
we will not be listing the parameters here. An interested user can look up the
file e.properties in the jPBC library. This type is not present in the charm
crypto library.
Type F: Using carefully crafted polynomials, k = 12 pairings can be con-
structed. Only 160 bits are needed to represent elements of one group and 320
bits for the other. Also, embedding degree k = 12 allows higher security short
signatures. The equation is of the form E : y2 = x3 + b. These type of curves
were discovered by Barreto and Naehrig and commonly known as BN curves[2].
There is only one type F curve built in the library. The parameters in the
file f.properties are -
type f
q 205523667896953300194896352429254920972540065223
r 205523667896953300194895899082072403858390252929
b 40218105156867728698573668525883168222119515413
beta 115334401956802802075595682801335644058796914268
alpha0 191079354656274778837764015557338301375963168470
alpha1 71445317903696340296199556072836940741717506375
Here, q is 158 bits or 20 bytes, r is 158 bits or 20 bytes. The parameter b is
the coefficient in the equation E : y2 = x3 + b. The size of the group elements
are as follows - since r is 20 bytes, any element in the group Zr is 20 bytes. An
element in the group G1 is an element over Fq. Since q is 20 bytes, an element of
group G1 is 2*20 = 40 bytes. The elements of the group G2 are 80 bytes and the
elements of group GT are 240 bytes. The code to generate type F parameters
is -
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ParametersGenerator pbcPg = new PBCTypeFCurveGenerator(rBits);
In the charm crypto library, a different type f curve is present. In there, q
is 254 bits or 32 bytes, r is also 254 bits or 32 bytes. The size of the group
elements are as follows - since r is 32 bytes, any element in the group Zr is 32
bytes. An element in the group G1 is an element over Fq. Since q is 32 bytes,
an element of group G1 is 2*32 = 64 bytes. The elements of the group G2 are
128 bytes and the elements of group GT are 384 bytes.
Type G: Type G curves are exactly the same structure as type D curves
with the only difference being in the embedding degree. The embedding degree
k is of 10. These types of curves were discovered by Freeman[6]. The parameters
are exactly the same as described in type D curve parameters. There is only
one type G curve built in the library called g149.properties. The parameters
are -
type g
q 503189899097385532598615948567975432740967203
n 503189899097385532598571084778608176410973351
h 1
r 503189899097385532598571084778608176410973351
a 465197998498440909244782433627180757481058321
b 463074517126110479409374670871346701448503064
k 10
The prime q is 149 bits the order r is also 149 bits. The size of the group
elements are as follows - since r is 149 bits or 19 bytes, any element in the group
Zr is 19 bytes. An element in the group G1 is an element over Fq. Since q is 149
bits or 19 bytes, an element of group G1 is 2*19 = 38 bytes. The elements of the
group G2 and GT are 190 bytes each. Apart from the parameters listed above
there are some more which we did not show, they are nk - number of points
in E(Fqk ), hk where nk = hk ∗ r ∗ r, coeff0, coeff1, coeff2 and nqr - quadratic
nonresidue in Fq. The code to generate type G parameters is -
ParametersGenerator pbcPg = new
PBCTypeGParametersGenerator(discriminant);
This type is not present in the charm crypto library.
Table 1 summarizes the different types of curves built in the JPBC library
and the different sizes of the group elements for each type of curve.
3 Identity-based Signature Schemes
As we mentioned earlier that there are several identity-based signature schemes
that are constructed on pairings. The only scheme that is implemented in the
JPBC library is the scheme by Paterson and Schuldt [15]. The three schemes
implemented in the charm crypto library are - Cha and Cheon [4] scheme, Hess
[7] scheme, and Waters [20] scheme. We will describe some notable signature
schemes apart from the ones already present in the libraries. Almost every
identity-based signature scheme has 4 stages - setup, extract, sign, and verify.
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Table 1: Sizes of the different group elements for different types of curves in
JPBC
Curve Name
Bits in
prime (q)
/
Bits in
order (r)
Size of
element in
Zr
Size of
element in
G1
Size of
element in
G2
Size of
element in
GT
a.properties 512 / 160
160 bits
or 20 bytes
1024 bits
or 128 bytes
1024 bits
or 128 bytes
1024 bits
or 128 bytes
a1.properties 1033 / 1022
1024 bits
or 128 bytes
2080 bits
or 260 bytes
2080 bits
or 260 bytes
2080 bits
or 260 bytes
d159.properties 159 / 158
160 bits
or 20 bytes
320 bits
or 40 bytes
960 bits
or 120 bytes
960 bits
or 120 bytes
d201.properties 201 / 181
184 bits
or 23 bytes
416 bits
or 52 bytes
1248 bits
or 156 bytes
1248 bits
or 156 bytes
d224.properties 224 / 224
224 bits
or 28 bytes
448 bits
or 56 bytes
1344 bits
or 168 bytes
1344 bits
or 168 bytes
e.properties 1020 / 160
160 bits
or 20 bytes
2048 bits
or 256 bytes
2048 bits
or 256 bytes
1024 bits
or 128 bytes
f.properties 158 / 158
160 bits
or 20 bytes
320 bits
or 40 bytes
640 bits
or 80 bytes
1920 bits
or 240 bytes
g149.properties 149 / 149
152 bits
or 19 bytes
304 bits
or 38 bytes
1520 bits
or 190 bytes
1520 bits
or 190 bytes
In order to have a consistent description of the schemes, we will use a fixed set
of notations.
Setup: This step is executed by the central authority or the PKG. The
setup generates the curve parameters. The different curves provided in the
library can be used to load the parameters. Let g1 be the generator of G1, g2
be the generator of G2. A random x ∈ Z
∗
n is chosen to be the master secret.
Two public keys P1 and P2 are calculated as - P1 = x · g1 and P2 = x · g2. They
are also called master public keys. An embedding function H is chosen such
that H(0, 1)∗ → G1. This embedding function converts a string to an element
in group G1. These are the public parameters - < g1, g2, P1, P2, H > and shared
with every participant in the system.
Extract: Takes as input the curve parameters, the master secret key x, and
a user’s identity and returns the users identity-based secret key. This step is
performed the central authority for each user A with identity IDA. Every user
connects to the central authority over a secure channel and shares its identity.
The identity which is mostly a string is converted to an element in G1 using
the embedding function H . The string is hashed using a hash function like
SHA-256, then converted to a number. Then point multiplication is used to get
the result - hash(number) · g1. We will call this CA where CA = H(IDA).The
syntax using JPBC is -
String identity = “myidentitystring”;
byte[] idhash = hashSHA256(identity);
Element idelem = G1.newElement().
setFromHash(idhash, 0, idhash.length).getImmutable();
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Element skid = idelem.powZn(secretKey).getImmutable();
This step can be done by anyone in the system. The users identity-based
secret key is calculated as VA = x ·CA. This can only be done by the PKG. The
syntax is -
Element skid = idelem.powZn(secretKey).getImmutable();
These two values - idelem and skid are CA and VA respectively. This is
returned to the user after the extract phase. Both values are elements of group
G1.
Sign: This step is performed by each user who wants to sign. If user A
wants to send a message to user B, the first step is to send its identity IDA
to the PKG and get the values (CA, VA). Using these values he can proceed to
sign the message. The particular steps for signing are different for each scheme
as we will show below.
Verify: This step is performed by the user who received a message. If
user A sends a message to user B, B does not need to contact the PKG to get
anything (assuming the public parameters are obtained). User B already knows
A’s identity IDA as this is public. B also received a message from A with a
signature - M and Sign. B will invoke verification using IDA, M , Sign, and
public parameters.
We will now describe some well-known signature schemes -
3.1 Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara scheme
The Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara scheme [16] was one of the first identity-based sig-
nature schemes that were published in 2000. The steps for generating and
verifying the signature are as follows -
Sign: The user A has already obtained (CA, VA) from PKG. To sign a
message m, a user A with the curve parameters and the secret key (CA, VA)
does the following:
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n. Compute ZA = r · g2.
2. Compute R by embedding the message m to G1.
3. Compute S = VA + rR.
A’s signature for the message m is - (ZA, S)
Verify:
1. Compute lhs = en(S, g2), where en is the pairing operation.
2. Compute rhs = en(CA, P2) ∗ en(R,ZA)
3. Check lhs
?
= rhs.
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Table 2: Signature size using different curves for the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara
scheme
Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Signature size
(bytes)
256 520 160 208 224 120 228
The above equation works because:
rhs = en(CA, P2) ∗ en(R,ZA)
= en(CA, x · g2) ∗ en(R, r · g2)
= en(x · CA, g2) ∗ en(r ·R, g2)
= en(g1, g2)
x·CA+r·R
= en(g1, g2)
VA+r·R
lhs = en(S, g2)
= en((VA + r.R) · g1, g2)
= en(g1, g2)
VA+r·R
The signature in this scheme is a tuple (ZA, S). Note that ZA is an element
of G2 and S is in G1(created from VA which is in G1 and R which is also in G1).
Using the table 1, we can see the signature size for the different curves are -
3.2 Paterson scheme
The Paterson scheme [14], 2002 is another notable signature scheme . The steps
for generating and verifying the signature are as follows -
Sign: The user A has already obtained (CA, VA) from PKG. To sign a
message m, a user A with the curve parameters and the secret key (CA, VA)
does the following:
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n. Compute ZA = r · g2.
2. Compute the hash h0 of the message m using any standard hash function
like SHA-256. h0 = H(m).
3. Compute the hash of ZA using any standard hash function like SHA-256.
h1 = H(ZA)
4. Compute S = r−1 · h0 · g1 + r
−1 · h1 · VA
A’s signature for the message m is - (ZA, S)
Verify:
1. Compute lhs = en(S,ZA), where en is the pairing operation.
2. Compute rhs = en(g1, g2)
h0 ∗ en(CA, P2)
h1
3. Check lhs
?
= rhs.
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Table 3: Signature size using different curves for the Paterson scheme
Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Signature size
(bytes)
256 520 160 208 224 120 228
The above equation works because:
rhs = en(g1, g2)
h0 ∗ en(CA, P2)
h1
= en(g1, g2)
h0 ∗ en(CA, x · g2)
h1
= en(g1, g2)
h0 ∗ en(x · CA, g2)
h1
= en(g1, g2)
h0 ∗ en(VA, g2)
h1
= en(g1, g2)
h0+VA∗h1
lhs = en(S,ZA)
= en(r
−1 · h0 · g1 + r
−1 · h1 · VA, r · g2)
= en(r
−1 · (h0 + h1 ∗ VA) · g1, r · g2)
= en(g1, g2)
r−1·(h0+VA∗h1)·r
= en(g1, g2)
h0+VA∗h1
The signature in this scheme is also a tuple (ZA, S). Note that ZA is an
element of G2 and S is in G1(created from VA which is in G1 and g1 which is
also in G1). This scheme generates the same signature size as the Sakai-Ohgishi-
Kasahara scheme but the construction is different. Using the table 1, we can
see the signature size for the different curves are -
3.3 Sakai-Kasahara scheme
The Sakai-Kasahara scheme [18] was published in 2003. In their work, the
authors described two types of signature schemes - one they called El-Gamal
analog and the other Schnorr analog. The construction of the El-Gamal analog
is as follows-
Sign: The user A has already obtained (CA, VA) from PKG. To sign a
message m, a user A with the curve parameters and the secret key (CA, VA)
does the following:
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n. Compute ZA = r · g2.
2. Choose xza as the x-coordinate of ZA.
3. Computer the hash of the message m using any standard hash function
like SHA-256. h = H(m).
4. Compute the hash of ZA using any standard hash function like SHA-256.
h1 = H(ZA)
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Table 4: Signature size using different curves for the Sakai-Kasahara scheme -
El-Gamal Analogue
Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Signature size
(bytes)
256 520 160 208 224 120 228
5. Compute S = r−1 · h · CA + r
−1 · xza · VA
A’s signature for the message m is - (ZA, S)
Verify:
1. Compute lhs = en(S,ZA), where en is the pairing operation.
2. Compute rhs = en(CA, h · g2 + xza · P2)
3. Check lhs
?
= rhs.
The above equation works because:
lhs = en(S,ZA)
= en(r
−1 · h · CA + r
−1 · xza · VA, r · g2)
= en(r
−1 · h · CA + r
−1 · xza · x · CA, r · g2)
= en(r
−1 · (h+ xza · x) · CA, r · g2)
= en(CA, g2)
r−1·(h+xza·x)·r
= en(CA, g2)
(h+xza·x)
rhs = en(CA, h · g2 + xza · P2)
= en(CA, h · g2 + xza · x · g2)
= en(CA, (h+ xza · x)g2)
= en(CA, g2)
(h+xza·x)
The signature in this scheme is also a tuple (ZA, S). Note that ZA is an element
of G2 and S is in G1(created from VA which is in G1 and CA which is also in
G1). This scheme generates the same signature size as the two previous schemes
but the construction is different. Using the table 1, we can see the signature
size for the different curves are -
The Sakai-Kasahara Schnorr analogue construction is as follows:
Sign: To sign a message m, a user A with the curve parameters and the
secret key (CA, VA) does the following:
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n. Compute ZA = r · g2.
2. Compute e = en(CA, ZA), where en is the pairing operation.
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Table 5: Signature size using different curves for the Sakai-Kasahara scheme -
Schnorr Analogue
Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Signature size
(bytes)
160 292 72 84 88 72 70
3. Compute h = H1(m ‖ e), whereH1 is a secure cryptographic hash function
such as SHA-256 and ‖ is the concatenation operation.
4. Compute S = hVA + rCA .
A’s signature for the message m is - (h, S)
Verify: The verification procedure is as follows:
1. Compute w = en(S, g2) ∗ en(CA,−hP2)
2. Check H1(m ‖ w)
?
= h
The above equation works because:
e = en(CA, ZA) = en(CA, r · g2) = en(CA, g2)
r
w = en(S, g2) ∗ en(CA,−hP2)
= en(hVA + rCA, g2) ∗ en(CA,−hx · g2)
= en(hx · CA + rCA, g2) ∗ en(CA, g2)
−hx
= en((hx+ r) · CA, g2) ∗ en(CA, g2)
−hx
= en(CA, g2)
hx+r ∗ en(CA, g2)
−hx
= en(CA, g2)
r
The signature in this scheme is also a tuple (h, S). Here h is a hash func-
tion. If we used SHA-160 then the size of h would be 20 bytes but it is not
recommended nowadays. For SHA-256 the size of h is 32 bytes. The parameter
S is an element of group G1 Using the table 1, we can see the signature size for
the different curves are -
All of the previous 3 schemes had an element of G2 in their signature which
caused the size to grow because an element of G2 is larger than an element of G1
for asymmetric pairings. For symmetric pairings, the element size is the same
in both.
3.4 Xun-Yi scheme
The Xun-Yi scheme [22], published in 2003 is another notable signature scheme.
The steps for generating and verifying the signature are as follows -
Sign: The user A has already obtained (CA, VA) from PKG. To sign a
message m, a user A with the curve parameters and the secret key (CA, VA)
does the following:
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Table 6: Signature size using different curves for the Xun Yi scheme.
Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Signature size
(bytes)
256 520 80 104 112 80 76
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n. Compute ZA = r · g1.
2. Compute h = H1(m ‖ ZA), where H1 is a secure cryptographic hash
function such as SHA-256 and ‖ is the concatenation operation.
3. Compute S = r · P1 + h · VA
A’s signature for the message m is - (ZA, S)
Verify:
1. Compute lhs = en(S, g2), where en is the pairing operation.
2. Compute rhs = en(ZA + h · CA, P2)
3. Check lhs
?
= rhs.
The above equation works because:
rhs = en(ZA + h · CA, P2)
= en(r · g1 + h · CA, x · g2)
= en(g1, g2)
(r+h·CA)·x
lhs = en(S, g2)
= en(r · P1 + h · VA, g2)
= en(r · x · g1 + h · x · CA, g2)
= en(g1, g2)
(r+h·CA)·x
The signature in this scheme is also a tuple (ZA, S). But both ZA and S are
elements of G1. Using the table 1, we can see the signature size for the different
curves are -
Comparing the schemes above, we can observe that the Sakai-Kasahara
Schnorr analog and the Xun Yi scheme produces much smaller signature sizes
than the other. This is mainly due to its construction. It can be observed that
the smaller signatures do not contain any element of G2 in their signature. The
Sakai-Kasahara contains a hash and an element of G1 and Xun Yi contains two
elements of G1.
4 Shorter signature size
In almost all of the signature schemes, the signature of a message contains an
element in group G1. As we observed for the schemes described above, the
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signature is a tuple and one of the variables is from the group G1. The Paterson
and Schuldt scheme [15] which is present in the JPBC library, the signature
size is a triple where all the three variables are elements in the group G1. Also,
in the Cha-Cheon scheme present in the charm crypto library, the signature is
a tuple, where both variables are elements in group G1. We did not describe
these two schemes as they are already implemented. Now, the elements in the
group G1 are points on the elliptic curve. They have two subcomponents the
X-coordinate and the Y-coordinate which are packed together. In the JPBC
library, the elements are assigned and computed using the class “Element”.
The fields are generated from the pairing curves i.e. the properties files. When
we print the “Element” from the group G1, we can observe that it contains the
two coordinates. The following syntax is used to generate a random element in
G1 -
Pairing pairing = PairingFactory.getPairing(“f.properties”);
PairingFactory.getInstance().setUsePBCWhenPossible(true);
Field G1 = pairing.getG1();
Element g1 = G1.newRandomElement().getImmutable();
System.out.println(”g1 - ”+g1);
System.out.println(”G1 bytes = ”+g1.toBytes().length);
The code produces the following output -
g1 - 1850050205405678718762488884335150904922997774,
55999770258652075328012601245471415805643870392,0
G1 bytes = 40
In order to extract the X and Y coordinate separately, the Element class
needs to be converted to a byte array. In that array, half of the array contains
the X coordinate the other half contains the Y coordinate. We can then separate
the two arrays and convert them to the BigInteger class.
Now every elliptic curve and consequently every pairing curve is defined by
an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b. Hence, the Y coordinate can be
calculated from the X coordinate. We do not need to store the Y coordinate in
the signature. The Y coordinate can be calculated from the X coordinate during
verification. But it has to be noted that when we plug in the value of X, there
will be two solutions for the Y coordinate and the square root is modulo prime.
For this reason, the way to distinguish between which value of Y to keep, there
needs to be some more data about the Y coordinate. The convention to do this
is to add one extra byte that will denote if the Y coordinate is odd or even.
When we discard the Y coordinate we can do a modulo 2 and if Y is odd, we
append the byte 02 before X value. If Y is odd we append 03. Using this point
compression technique, it can be observed that a signature which contains an
element of G1 and has a size of 2n bytes(assuming each X and Y are n bytes),
can be compressed to a size of (n + 1) bytes. The code for point compression
is provided in the Appendix.
This technique can only be applied to signature schemes where the signature
contains an element in G1. We are not sure if the elements of G2 and GT
can be compressed. So for all of the schemes that are implemented already
and the schemes that we described above can utilize this compression. Also,
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the Sakai-Kasahara Schnorr analog scheme contains a hash value in one of the
tuple. Recall that the Sakai-Kasahara signature was (h, S), where h is a hash
function like SHA-256. Along with the point compression, the hash value can
also be shortened using the techniques that are used to generate Ethereum[21]
or Bitcoin [13] addresses. In Ethereum, the public key is hashed using keccak
256 hash algorithm. Then instead of taking the entire 32 bytes (64 bytes in hex
representation), the Ethereum blockchain takes only the last 20 bytes (40 bytes
in hex) and generates the wallet address. Each wallet address is 40 hex bytes but
the hash generates 64 hex bytes. There is also another way of doing the same
hash compression. When computing the verification step - en(CA,−hP2). Here
−h is the negative hash value integer and we perform a scalar multiplication
with the point P2. There is only one integer group involved and that is Zr
where r is the order of the curve. So when performing that scalar multiplication
−h ·P2, JPBC internally converts the hash value to an element of Zr by modulo
r. Hence, instead of writing the signature as (h, S) we can rewrite that as (R,S)
where R = h mod r. This implies our signature is now of the form (R,S), where
R is an element of the group Zr. But this method will not be efficient for curves
which have large orders like the elements in the type a1 curve are 128 bytes.
In table 7, we list the signature sizes for the signature schemes with and
without the point compression. For the Sakai-Kasahara Schnorr scheme, the
size is inclusive of the hash compression along with the point compression.
In order to recover the Y coordinate during verification we need to do point
decompression i.e. retrieve Y using X and the extra byte. The X value is
plugged in the equation and the square root modulo prime is calculated. The
two values of Y are obtained. Then using the extra byte we know if we should
keep the odd Y or the even Y. Note that every curve has a different equation
so the decompression method needs to consider the curve and the coefficients a
and b. Also, there exists a very easy way to compute the square root modulo
prime when the prime modulo 4 equals 3. If prime ≡ 3 mod 4 -
Y coordinate = (Y 2)
prime+1
4 mod prime.
However if prime ≡ 1 mod 4, then there is no one line way to calculate the
square root. The code for point decompression is provided in the Appendix.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we described some of the popular identity based signature schemes.
A few of them have been implemented. We did not describe the already imple-
mented schemes but in comparison we listed how their signature sizes compare
with other schemes which have not been implemented. From the schemes dis-
cussed in this work, it can be concluded that the signature scheme that produces
the shortest signature size is the Sakai - Kasahara Schnorr type signature. But
this scheme has not been implemented yet in either JPBC or charm crypto li-
brary. We also discussed techniques to further shorten the signature size which
is not present in either of the libraries yet.
In the work by Kar [9], they have used Shamir’s IBS and using 1024 bit
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Table 7: Signature size of different schemes with and without compression
Signature Scheme Curve type a a1 d159 d201 d224 f g
Sakai
-Ohgishi
-Kasahara
Signature is
(G1,G2)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
128 + 128
= 256
260 + 260
= 520
40 + 120
= 160
52 + 156
= 208
56 + 168
= 224
40 + 80
= 120
38 + 190
= 228
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
65 + 128
= 193
131 + 260
= 391
21 + 120
= 141
27 + 156
= 183
29 + 168
= 197
21 + 80
= 101
20 + 190
= 210
Paterson
Signature is
(G1,G2)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
128 + 128
= 256
260 + 260
= 520
40 + 120
= 160
52 + 156
= 208
56 + 168
= 224
40 + 80
= 120
38 + 190
= 228
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
65 + 128
= 193
131 + 260
= 391
21 + 120
= 141
27 + 156
= 183
29 + 168
= 197
21 + 80
= 101
20 + 190
= 210
Sakai
- Kasahara
El-Gamal
Signature is
(G1,G2)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
128 + 128
= 256
260 + 260
= 520
40 + 120
= 160
52 + 156
= 208
56 + 168
= 224
40 + 80
= 120
38 + 190
= 228
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
65 + 128
= 193
131 + 260
= 391
21 + 120
= 141
27 + 156
= 183
29 + 168
= 197
21 + 80
= 101
20 + 190
= 210
Sakai
- Kasahara
Schnorr
Signature is
(hash,G1)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
32 + 128
= 160
32 + 260
= 292
32 + 40
= 72
32 + 52
= 84
32 + 56
= 88
32 + 40
= 72
32 + 38
= 70
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
20 + 65
= 85
20 + 131
= 151
20 + 21
= 41
20 + 27
= 47
20 + 29
= 49
20 + 21
= 41
20 + 20
= 40
Xun Yi
Signature is
(G1,G1)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
128 + 128
= 256
260 + 260
= 520
40 + 40
= 80
52 + 52
= 104
56 + 56
= 112
40 + 40
= 80
38 + 38
= 76
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
65 + 65
= 130
131 + 131
= 262
21 + 21
= 42
27 + 27
= 54
29 + 29
= 58
21 + 21
= 42
20 + 20
= 40
Cha - Cheon
(available in
charm crypto)
Signature is
(G1,G1)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
128 + 128
= 256
260 + 260
= 520
40 + 40
= 80
52 + 52
= 104
56 + 56
= 112
40 + 40
= 80
38 + 38
= 76
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
65 + 65
= 130
131 + 131
= 262
21 + 21
= 42
27 + 27
= 54
29 + 29
= 58
21 + 21
= 42
20 + 20
= 40
Paterson
- Schuldt
(available in JPBC)
Signature is
(G1,G1,G1)
Signature size
without compression
(bytes)
3 * 128
= 384
3 * 260
= 780
3 * 40
= 120
3 * 52
= 156
3 * 56
= 168
3 * 40
= 120
3 * 38
= 114
Signature size
with compression
(bytes)
3 * 65
= 195
3 * 131
= 393
3 * 21
= 63
3 * 27
= 81
3 * 29
= 87
3 * 21
= 63
3 * 20
= 60
key they generated 1024 bit signature size which translates to 128 bytes. When
encoding the signature as nucleotide bases i.e. A, C, G, and T, the length
becomes 512 base pairs (each base pair can be written in 2 bits). Using the
Sakai- Kasahara scheme along with the compression technique, the signature
can be reduced to 41 bytes or 164 base pairs using the type f or d159 curve and
to 40 bytes or 160 base pairs using the g type curve.
Although we can do point compression on elements of G1, it will be inter-
esting to see if the elements of G2 and GT can be compressed. If this can be
done then the schemes that have an element of G2 in the signature along with
G1 can be further compressed.
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Appendix - Point compression and decompres-
sion code in Java
private static String pointcompress(Element elem) {
// TODO Auto-generated method stub
byte[] elembytes = elem.toBytes();
int elemlength = elembytes.length;
byte[] xbytes = new byte[elemlength / 2];
byte[] ybytes = new byte[elemlength / 2];
for (int i = 0; i < elemlength; i++) {
if (i < elemlength / 2) {
xbytes[i] = elembytes[i];
} else {
ybytes[i - (elemlength / 2)] = elembytes[i];
}
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}BigInteger TWO = new BigInteger("2");
BigInteger Xcord = new BigInteger(1,xbytes);
BigInteger Ycord = new BigInteger(1,ybytes);
String prefix = null;
if((Ycord.mod(TWO)).compareTo(BigInteger.ZERO) == 0) {
prefix = "2";
}
else {
prefix = "3";
}
String XcordHex = Xcord.toString(16);
String returnVal = prefix.concat(XcordHex).trim();
return returnVal;
}
private static Element pointdecompress(String compressedpoint,
BigInteger prime, Field Group, BigInteger a,
BigInteger b) {
// TODO Auto-generated method stub
String firstbyte = compressedpoint.substring(0, 1);
String X = compressedpoint.substring(1, compressedpoint.length());
System.out.println(X);
BigInteger TWO = new BigInteger("2");
BigInteger flag = new BigInteger(firstbyte, 16).mod(TWO);
BigInteger Xcord = new BigInteger(X, 16);
BigInteger YcordFinal = BigInteger.ZERO;
BigInteger xpow3 = (Xcord.pow(3)).mod(prime);
BigInteger ax = a.multiply(Xcord);
int checklength =
Group.newRandomElement().getImmutable().toBytes().length;
BigInteger Ysquare = (xpow3.add(ax).add(b)).mod(prime);
BigInteger Ycord = BigInteger.ZERO;
// only works for curves where prime mod 4 = 3
if(prime.mod(new
BigInteger("4")).toString().equalsIgnoreCase("3")) {
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BigInteger pplus1by4 = (prime.add(BigInteger.ONE)).divide(new
BigInteger("4"));
Ycord = Ysquare.modPow(pplus1by4, prime);
}
// if prime mod 4 = 1
else {
Ycord = sqrtP(Ysquare, prime);
}
BigInteger modval = Ycord.mod(TWO);
if (flag.compareTo(modval) == 0) {
YcordFinal = Ycord;
} else {
YcordFinal = prime.subtract(Ycord);
}
byte[] xba = bigIntegerToBytes(Xcord);
byte[] yba = bigIntegerToBytes(YcordFinal);
byte[] xfinal = new byte[checklength / 2];
byte[] yfinal = new byte[checklength / 2];
if (xba.length < checklength / 2) {
xfinal[0] = 0x00;
for (int i = 0; i < xba.length; i++) {
xfinal[i + 1] = xba[i];
}
} else {
System.arraycopy(xba, 0, xfinal, 0, xba.length);
}
if (yba.length < checklength / 2) {
yfinal[0] = 0x00;
for (int i = 0; i < yba.length; i++) {
yfinal[i + 1] = yba[i];
}
} else {
System.arraycopy(yba, 0, yfinal, 0, yba.length);
}
byte[] c = new byte[xfinal.length + yfinal.length];
System.arraycopy(xfinal, 0, c, 0, xfinal.length);
System.arraycopy(yfinal, 0, c, xfinal.length, yfinal.length);
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Element sig = Group.newZeroElement();
int sign = sig.setFromBytes(c);
return sig.getImmutable();
}
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